

61-6841

7 AUG 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Security Factors of the Feasibility
Study in the Occupancy of the New
Headquarters at Langley, Virginia

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. In the assessment of the security factors concerning the occupancy of the new building site at Langley, Virginia, these factors can best be summarized from the standpoint of several probabilities. The first would be the present plans for occupancy of the building. The second, on the premise of the DDP and a considerable number of DDS support personnel being located in some building in Washington, D. C. and all remaining elements housed in the new headquarters site. The third premise would be the partial occupancy by the CIA at the new building site with other governmental elements being housed in the same structure.

3. There are definite security advantages to be achieved by the relocation of Agency personnel under the present plan at the new headquarters site. The security advantages will tend to correct a series of security deficiencies which are inherent in the separation of the Agency components in a total of ☐ buildings located throughout the metropolitan area. The mere fact of endeavoring to conduct Agency activities from ☐ separate locations has necessitated the development of numerous security procedures for protective purposes.

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(a) COMMUNICATIONS - ☐ couriers are required to maintain the transmission of Agency material between all ☐ buildings. The movement of such material creates a security hazard and is time consuming. Agency officials attending meetings involving movement between buildings

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must necessarily personally carry highly classified and sensitive information. The difficulty of personal communication between officials scattered in [] buildings naturally promoted heavy reliance on the telephone system. Despite requirements to limit classification of information discussed and the security weaknesses inherent in the telephone system, heavy use of the telephone system has been necessary. With all major components located in the new building, the need for communication outside the building will be reduced tremendously. Personal consultations can take place under secure conditions, [] system within the building will permit conversations classified through secret, the movement of classified materials between components of the Agency will be largely within the one building and within highly secure conveyor and tube systems. The potential of compromise of information through loss of or interception of documents or technical penetration of communication systems will be greatly reduced. Obviously, the timeliness of secure communications will be of tremendous advantage.

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(b) The control and protection of [] Agency buildings, both fully and partially occupied by CIA, requires [] guards at a cost of [] a year. Many of the buildings are of a temporary, non-permanent type which precludes, on a cost and security basis, the desired use of vaults and secure areas because of the inadequacy of the building structure. Partial occupancy of buildings creates many security hazards from the standpoint of control of the area, control of visitors and protection of the identity of Agency personnel. The multiple government jurisdictions involved in providing char force services, building services and repairs, compliance with building regulations, fire protection and similar problems tends to qualify what would otherwise be a full control over our buildings and activities within. The collection and disposition of approximately [] pounds of classified waste in a yearly period involves considerable security hazards through lack of adequate disposition facilities, collection and transportation of the waste. Further, the difficulties in rapid security response to our alarm systems, investigation of security violations, malfunctioning of building services, fires, fire alarms, power failures, and security inspections in [] widely separated buildings impedes an effective and efficient security program.

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25X1 In the new headquarters building the Agency will have complete building control, both of the ground surrounding the building and the building itself, on a full 24 hour basis. The building structure will permit the establishment of [] secure areas, eliminating the necessity for expensive safes and permitting ready but secure access to volumes of highly classified information. The establishment of multiple secure areas permits closer control of the information and persons having access to that information. Security response to any form of an emergency situation, both during working hours and particularly after hours, can be almost instantaneous which will be a great advantage and will be a correction of a present serious weakness. The char force services and building maintenance repairs and similar actions, particularly after working hours, will be on a highly controlled security basis.

25X1 (c) The control of visitors and the processing of applicants for employment has been a serious problem because of lack of adequate facilities to meet with visitors and prevent their exposure to numbers of other Agency personnel. The frequent need for visitors to go from building to building to meet different officials and the vast traffic of applicants in and out of buildings in the normal entrance process has caused security difficulties. In the fiscal year of 1961 there were [] visitors to all Agency buildings. Of this number [] were foreign nationals, mostly officials and [] general visitors on official business. The new headquarters building will provide centralized control for the processing of applicants on a timely, economical and secure basis. In like manner, visitors will be more properly controlled and can be handled without necessarily exposing them to numbers of Agency personnel. 25X1

25X1 (d) The location of components of the Agency in single or group buildings [] [] [] logically became known through the normal course of Agency business. This permitted an easier means of identifying employees with specific components and thereby their principal field of activity. Although all possible security safeguards have been taken to prevent identification 25X1

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of components and employees thereof, the simple fact of location in any one of [] buildings serves to provide some degree of identification. The use of personal vehicles and possible identification through license tags, the use of car pools involving employees in different buildings presents some security hazard in protecting the identity of employees. In the new headquarters building located in a somewhat isolated and wooded area with access only through main thoroughfares with adequate protection over the surrounding grounds, the central housing of a large number of personnel provides a high degree of anonymity to the individual employee and to the section or component in which he works. Full occupancy of the building will involve some [] employees who, it is estimated, will arrive each morning in approximately [] vehicles within a period of one hour and will leave the building premises in approximately the same time at the close of business. This traffic to and from heavily used thoroughfares and highways will be practically impossible to identification by outsiders. The parking areas within the building grounds will be patrolled and any effort to obtain license numbers of employees automobiles or identification in this manner will be almost precluded. The very volume and speed with which personnel will come and go will be a security safeguard not now available at the present [] buildings occupied.



(f) The functioning of the Security Office requires the closest personal coordination between the Security Office and all components of the Agency. This has proved to be extremely difficult when located in [] buildings and those security problems in buildings farthest removed from the

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center of operations in I Building get less attention than should be the case. The need for direct consultation with representatives from several offices on a given case proves time consuming and not responsive to emergency situations where immediate decisions must be made. Frequently, it is almost impossible to get representatives from divisions widely scattered in different buildings into a meeting to expeditiously resolve troublesome problems. The quality and efficiency of security tends to be impaired with the geographic separation of the components, the employees, the materials and the problems involved. At the new building this problem will be considerably eliminated by the availability of personnel from all components of the Agency. This is particularly true in personnel security, physical security and operational support to covert activities. It is believed that extensive modifications of security requirements and regulations can be made in view of these factors.

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communications, transmission of documents, travel of personnel, physical security controls, response to emergency situations, timeliness of action, ability to consult with separated components and many similar security problems will continue in full effect. First, there is the apparent non-availability of adequate space to house this number of Agency employees in the District or in the immediate vicinity, which might result in the occupancy of a number of separate buildings.



Practically all of the present problems and

difficulties in conducting security protection and support of Agency activities would be existent, in various forms [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The internal difficulties of both the Security Office and the other DDS components of the splitting of their operations to serve a divided Agency would require many duplications of services and certainly a loss of efficiency and quality in performance of assigned functions.

5. The new site at Langley is designed to accomodate [REDACTED] employees. [REDACTED] DDS are located elsewhere, the [REDACTED] remaining employees at Langley would be occupying less than half the available space. On this premise, the other elements of the Agency not contemplated as moving to the new building, might be assigned the unused space. This would comprise [REDACTED] operations, [REDACTED]

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In the event that the Agency should occupy only half of the Langley site, it is obvious that other agencies of government will be located in the building to fill the remaining space. Regardless of what agency or agencies will be selected, this will effectively destroy the elaborate security controls over the new building. No other agency employs the same type of security control as CIA. Our requirements will be in basic conflict with the requirements of the other agencies. The new building was designed to be a complete

security unit with conveyor and tube systems extending into all cores of the building. The pneumatic tube and conveyor systems are operable only when the building is fully occupied. If partially occupied, the systems must be closed down. It would then be necessary to seal off half the building from the other occupants, and attempt to operate our security system within our half. This would be extremely difficult, if not almost impossible, since all building services, telephone systems, entrances and exits, elevator services, power units, air conditioning, and similar features were designed for total occupancy. Security hazards and difficulties will be occasioned by agency efforts to operate our half of the building and still accomodate the needs and requirements of the occupants of the other half of the building. More importantly, it would be a full co-mingling of Agency employees with the other occupants in the corridors, the dining rooms, use of the auditorium, parking areas and similar facilities. This will permit ready identification of Agency personnel, official visitors to the Agency and DDS [redacted] who have business at the Langley site. The possibility of compromise of information and communications is very possible under such a mixed up situation. The net result of such a situation would be a serious weakening of the entire Agency security system. This, when coupled with a divided Agency [redacted] located in another area of the city, cannot help but cause a deterioration of the Security Office ability to maintain adequate security controls. Physical security controls can, as a rule, be developed to meet, in some degree, the security requirements no matter how unfavorable the situation may be. The principal asset of the Agency, however, is our professional personnel and the security protection of their identities, assignments, nature of activities and the cover devices under which they operate. In a circumstance where the Agency is divided and non-CIA personnel occupy part of the site at Langley, this protection will, for all practical purposes, be greatly diminished as there will be a pinpointing of clandestine services at whatever site they occupy, and there will be a co-mingling of non-Agency personnel with our employees at Langley. [redacted]

6. On the security factors involved I have highlighted the basic problems and their general effect on the security of the Agency. Obviously, in such a complicated circumstance as set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5, there are innumerable detailed security difficulties which will impede an effective security program. The importance of detail should not be overlooked as it is the detail of preparation and the strict maintenance of cover and communications that determines the success of any intelligence operation.


Shepherd Edwards
Director of Security

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